

API Security: come proteggersi dalle 10 minacce più frequenti (OWASP)



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What's the security problems /w API?



How can I mitigate the risks?





OWASP API Security Top 10


1. Broken Object Level Authorization
2. Broken User Authentication
3. Excessive Data Exposure
4. Lack of Resources & Rate Limiting
5. Broken Function Level
6. Mass Assignment
7. Security Misconfiguration
8. Injection
9. Improper Assets Management
10. Insufficient Logging & Monitoring



OWASP API Security Top 10

 Authentication/Authorization

 Data Protection

 Governance/Operations

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*Categorization according to Isabelle Mauny of 42 Crunch



Authentication & Authorization



API 02

Broken User Authentication

Use case

Authentication mechanisms are implemented incorrectly.

Allow attackers to compromise authentication tokens or to exploit implementation flaws to **assume other user's identities** temporarily or permanently.

Compromising system's ability to identify the client/user, **compromises API security overall.**





How to prevent



- Use standard authentication protocols like **OAuth2** & **OpenIdConnect**
- Use short-lived access tokens
- **Multi-factor authentication**
- Authenticate your apps (so you know who is talking to you)
- Use **stricter rate-limiting** for **authentication**, implement **lockout policies** and **weak password checks**

- Check all possible ways to authenticate to all APIs

(!) Test authentication with all kind of combinations



API 01

Broken Object Level Authorization

Use case

Attacker **substitutes ID of their resource** in API call with **an ID of a resource belonging to another user**.

Lack of proper **authorization checks** allows access.

Represent in about 40% of all API attacks

<https://salt.security/blog/owasp-api-security-top-10-explained>

01 – BOLA Broken Object Level Authorization





How to prevent

01 – BOLA Broken Object Level Authorization



- Don't rely on IDs sent from client
- **Implement authorization checks** with **user policies** and in **every controller layer (onion approach)**
- Avoid physical IDs or serial IDs (675, 676, 678,...). Use random or non-guessable IDs (like UUIDs)

(!) **Test this use case**



API 05

Broken Function Level


Use case

API relies on client to use user level or admin level APIs.

Attacker figures out the “hidden” admin/unauthorized and un protected API methods and invokes them directly

Can be a matter of knowing the URL:

- /api/**users**/v1/user/my_financial_info (authorized)
- /api/**admins**/v1/users/all_info (hidden, not authorized and not protected)





How to prevent

05 - Broken Function Level



- Do not rely on the client, to enforce admin access
- **Design properly your authorization policies**
 - OAuth scopes can help here
- Deny all access by default
- RBAC, only **allow operations to users belonging to the appropriate group or role**
- Whenever possible separate admin and non admin operation, or avoid admin/non-admin on the same API
- Restrict access to admin API
 - By Mutual TLS, IP Range

(!) **Test this use case**



Data Protection



API 04

Lack of Resources & Rate Limiting

Use case


API is not protected against an **excessive amount of calls** or payload sizes.

An API client can make thousands API calls and **the server will still try to fulfill all requests.**

Attackers use that for **DoS** and **brute force attacks**

Attackers can **fire up large number of requests** to harvest data

```
https://api.example.com/v1.1/profile/email/view?user_id=123  
https://api.example.com/v1.1/profile/email/view?user_id=124  
https://api.example.com/v1.1/profile/email/view?user_id=125  
...  
...  
...  
https://api.example.com/v1.1/profile/email/view?user_id=2345
```





How to prevent

04 – Rate Limiting




Mitigate data scrapping by putting rate limiting in place (and alerting!)

- **Implement a limit on how often a client can call the API within a defined timeframe**
- Appropriate rate and resource limit for each functionality
- **Notify the client when the limit is exceeded**
- Limits on “containerized resources” (CPU, RAM, etc.)



How to prevent



- **Payload / page size limits as well**

<p>Legitimate – max_return and page_size request attributes are normal</p>	<p>Attack – Attackers modify the request to return an abnormally high response size</p>
<pre>POST /example/api/v1/provision/user/search HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: AHC/1.0 Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 131 X-Forwarded-For: 10.93.23.4</pre>	<pre>POST /example/api/v1/provision/user/search HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: AHC/1.0 Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 131 X-Forwarded-For: 10.93.23.4</pre>
<pre>{ "search_filter": "user_id=exampleId_100", "max_return": "250", "page_size": "250", "return_attributes": [] }</pre>	<pre>{ "search_filter": "user_id=exampleId_100", "max_return": "20000", "page_size": "20000", "return_attributes": [] }</pre>




API 03

Excessive Data Exposure

Use case

API exposing a lot more data than the client legitimately needs, **relying on the client to do the filtering**

Attacker calls the API directly and gets sensitive data




<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrOf74YmvVQ>





How to prevent

03 – Excessive Data Exposure



- Never rely on client, to filter data
- **Check the responses from the API to make sure they contain only legitimate data.**
- Backend developers should always ask themselves "who is the consumer of the data?" before exposing a new API endpoint.
- **Don't forget about error responses!**



API 06

Mass Assignment


Use case

API is working with the data structures.

An attacker can update object properties that they should not have access to, allowing them to escalate privileges, tamper with data, and bypass security mechanisms


Received **payload is “blindly transformed into an object”** and stored

Legitimate - Client sends a legitimate request	Attack - Attacker sends the same request but adds the admin role in the request body
<pre>PUT /api/v2/users/5deb9097 HTTP/1.1 { "_id": "5deb9097", "address": "*****, NY City, NY", "company_role": "Investment Services", "email": "*****", "first_name": "*****", "full_name": "*****", "job_title": "Broker", "last_name": "*****", "phone_number": "*****" }</pre>	<pre>PUT /api/v2/users/5deb9097 HTTP/1.1 { "_id": "5deb9097", "address": "*****, NY City, NY", "company_role": "Investment Services", "email": "*****", "first_name": "*****", "full_name": "*****", "is_admin": true, "is_sso": true, "job_title": "Broker", "last_name": "*****", "permission_type": "admin", "phone_number": "*****", "role": "admin", "sso_type": "admin", "system_user_type": "admin", "system_user_type_cd": 2, "user_type": "admin", "user_type_cd": 10 }</pre>





How to prevent



- **Input validation!** Never rely on client
- Validate can happen on client side but **must be done always on server side**
- Whitelist the props allowed to the client
- If possible, **avoid** using functions that **automatically bind a client's input** into code **variables** or **internal objects**.
- **Use secure and updated serializer/deserializer libraries**

Test your API hammered with bad data




API 08

Injection


Use case

Attacker constructs API calls that include SQL-, NoSQL-, LDAP-, OS- and other commands that the API or **backend behind it blindly executes**

- SQL, NoSQL, LDAP, OS commands, ORM, ...




<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rr0f74YmvVQ>





How to prevent



- **Input validation!** Never rely on client. **Validate, filter, sanitize all incoming data.**
 - Perform data validation using a single, trustworthy, and actively maintained library
- Define **data types** and **strict patterns for all string** parameters
- Define, limit, and enforce API outputs to prevent data leaks

Test this your API when hammered with bad data !



Governance & Operations



API 07

Security Misconfiguration


Use case

Poor configuration of the API servers allows attackers to exploit them.

- misconfigured HTTP headers
- unnecessary features are enabled (e.g., HTTP verbs)
- permissive Cross-Origin resource sharing (CORS)
- verbose error messages
- the latest security patches are missing
- ...


66% of API incident are due for misconfigured APIs

[IBM Security X-Force report - https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/WMDZOWK6](https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/WMDZOWK6)





How to prevent



- **Disable unnecessary features**
- **Automated process to locate configuration flaws**
- Repeatabe hardening and patching processes
- Restrict administrative access




API 09

Improper Assets Management

Use case


Attacker finds **non-production versions of the API**: such as staging, testing, beta or earlier versions - **that are not as well protected**, and uses those to launch the attack





How to prevent

09 – Improper Asset Management



- **Inventory all API hosts**
- **Limit access to anything that should not be public**
- **Limit access to production data:** segregate access to production and non-production data.
- Implement additional controls such as API firewalls
- **Properly retire old versions or backport security fixes**



API 10

Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

Use case

Lack of proper logging, monitoring, and alerting let attacks go unnoticed


- Logs are not protected for integrity
- Logs are not integrated into SIEM (Security Information and Event Management systems)
- Logs and Alerts are poorly designed





How to prevent

10 – Insufficient Logging & Monitoring



- Include enough detail in your logs to identify attackers:
 - **login failed attempts,**
 - **denied access,**
 - ...
 - **input validation failures, any failures in security policy checks**
- **Avoid having sensitive data in logs** - If you need the information for debugging purposes, **redact it partially.**
- Ensure that logs are formatted to be consumable by other tools
- Integrate with SIEMs and other dashboards, monitoring, alerting tools

Remarkable Actions For API SECURITY



Remarkable Actions for API Security

1. **Utilizzare strumenti di API Security & API Management**

2. API First & Shift Left

1. API Spec & Security Development Guidelines


3. Security Test, test, test!

4. ApiOps: GitOps and DevSecOps: automate whole API Lifecycle

- **Firewalls & WAF (Web Application Firewall)**
- **API Gateway**
 - Traffic control & Security policies
 - Authentication and Authorization
 - Observability: reporting, alerting, log & tracing
- **API Access Management**
 - MFA (Multi Factor Authentication)
 - **SSO, OIDC** or **OAuth2** support /w IdP
 - Integration /w LDAP and secure identity repositories


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
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https://youtu.be/JI_rm1xMSVk

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 1. API Spec & Security Development Guidelines
3. Security Test, test, test!
4. **ApiOps: GitOpts and DevSecOps: automate whole API Lifecycle**
5. **Collaboration between: API Team, Dev Team, Ops and Security Team**



Grazie

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